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Introduction
Former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych claimed that he was turfed from office in 
a coup last year. Was it a coup when Hosni Mubarak resigned from office and relinquished 
his powers to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces in 2011 after wide popular protests?1 
Zeinel Abidin Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Ben Ali, recently claimed that a coup forced her husband 
to flee the country.2 Could it also be accepted as a coup when the Egyptian military ousted 
from power Egypt’s first elected president, Mohammed Morsi, in July 2013? Students of 
civil-military relations (CMR) seem less capable than ever to provide a forthright answer to 
these questions. How can we explain this post-Cold War bafflement? The explanation this 
1ozan o. Varol, ‘the democratic Coup d’etat’, Harvard International Law Journal 53(2) (summer 2012), p. 293.
2 Gaëlle le roux, ‘Ben ali’s wife blames general for tunisia ‘coup d’état’, France 24, 23 June 2012, http://www.france24.com/
en/20120623-ben-ali-wife-leila-blames-general-tunisia-coup-d-etat-saudi-arabia/.
ABSTRACT
When a military staged an intervention during the Cold War, students 
of civil-military relations could quite easily tell if it was a coup d’état. 
This no longer seems to be the case. The reason may be the regnant 
understanding of coup d’état as a violent (bloody), swift, and 
extralegal/extra-constitutional seizure of power by first and foremost 
military officers or members of state apparatus after a long time of 
secret planning. This article takes stock of political complexities 
surrounding coups in our times by studying the nationally and 
internationally neglected case of February 28th (1997) coup process in 
Turkey as a ‘deviant case’, based on newly-revealed military documents 
as primary sources and several previously unstudied memoirs by 
army officers of the period. It argues that the February 28th coup 
was deliberately stretched over a long process, it was violent but not 
bloody, was staged almost openly through ‘theoretically constitutional 
political operations’ and psychological warfare against the elected 
government. Several select ‘civilian’ groups from the media, judiciary, 
trade unions, and non-governmental organisations were happily 
enlisted by the military as active participants in the coup caravan 
and without them as unique and pioneering a coup as the February 
28th could not be executed.
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article offers is that CMR scholars have been far too preoccupied with the questions of why 
and when armed forces intervene that they have forgotten to revisit who intervenes and 
how. They presumed the ‘classical’ notion of coup d’état to be still valid and continued to 
assume that coups are planned in absolute secrecy and made by soldiers or members of 
state apparatus, suddenly, extra-legally/unconstitutionally and mostly, violently. Yet, could 
it be the case that the nature and method of coups have changed after the Cold War?
This paper argues that actors of coups and how they occur may have undergone an 
unnoticed but critical change after the Cold War by studying the February 28th (1997) coup 
process in Turkey as a ‘deviant case’. As is well known, deviant case studies are particularly 
helpful in helping scholars ‘refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables’.3 
Although propositions arrived by deviant case studies need further comparative studies 
to carry greater theoretical value, they might provide precious insights because they defy 
established generalisations.4 An in-depth study of the February 28th as a deviant case of 
traditional coups might allow us to better understand why coups are getting stranger and 
harder to define nowadays5 and help redraw the fine lines that exist between revolutions, 
coups and legitimate popular pressure.
It may be due to our old, but still prevalent, understanding of coups that several schol-
ars have missed to capture the February 28th as coup that it really was. The February 28th 
is conspicuously absent from four major coup and civil unrest datasets compiled after the 
Cold War.6 The international neglect ran parallel to domestic neglect inside Turkey. Even 
though the February 28th coup has had significant reverberations in Turkish politics, it 
was either ignored altogether7 or it was simply glossed over as ‘the strike by the Turkish 
military’,8 ‘Refah-Yol-military confrontation’,9 ‘soft military intervention (countermobiliza-
tion)’,10 and ‘a move undertaken by the military’.11 Surely, some studies referred to the 
February 28th as ‘postmodern coup d’état’, ‘indirect intervention’ or ‘soft coup’; yet the 
adjectives of ‘postmodern’ and ‘soft’ were often used in order to steal from the coupness 
of February 28th.
3 arendt lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, The American Political Science Review, 65(3) (1971), 
p. 682–93.
4James Mahoney, ‘Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics’, Comparative Political Studies 40(2) (2007), p. 122–44.
5 Jonathan M. Powell, ‘the Man who would be King?’, 28 february 2014, http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/blog/
the-man-who-would-be-king.
6 Monty G. Marshall and donna ramsey Marshall, ‘Coup d’état events, 1946-2013’, 2014, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/
CsPCoupsCodebook2013.pdf; Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton l. thyne, ‘Global instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: a 
new dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 48(2) (2011), pp. 249–59; ivan Perkins, Vanishing Coup: The Pattern of World 
History since 1310 (london: rowman littlefield, 2013);
  nikolay Marinov and hein Goemans, ‘Coups and democracy’, British Journal of Political Science 44(4), (2014) p. 799-825; 
sPeed Project-Civil unrest event data, Cline Center for Democracy, http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/speed/event/ 
(accessed 14 february 2015).
7Yaprak Gürsoy, ‘türkiye’de sivil-asker İlişkilerinin dönüşümünün sebepleri’, Uluslararası İlişkiler 11(43) (fall 2014), pp. 157–80.
8 elisabeth Özdalga, ‘education in the name of ‘order and Progress’ reflections on the recent eight Year obligatory school 
reform in turkey’, The Muslim World 89(3-4) (1999), p. 414.
9 Metin heper and aylin Güney ‘the Military and the Consolidation of democracy: the recent turkish experience’, Armed 
Forces & Society 26(4) (2000), p. 647.
10Banu eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (new York: Cambridge university Press, 2010), p. 214.
11 hasret dikici Bilgin, ‘foreign Policy orientation of turkey’s Pro-islamist Parties: a Comparative study of the aKP and refah’, 
Turkish Studies 9(3) (2010), p. 410; for a few articles describing the event in passing as a coup, see Karabelias, Gerassimos, 
‘dictating the upper tide: Civil Military relations in the Post-Özal decade, 1993-2003’, Turkish Studies 9(3) (2008), pp. 457-
473, fn. 9; tanel demirel, ‘soldiers and Civilians’, Middle Eastern Studies 40(1) (2004), pp. 127–50; Jeremy salt, ‘turkey's 
Military democracy’, Current History 98 (1999), p. 72–8; M. hakan Yavuz, ‘Cleansing islam from the Public sphere’, Journal 
of International Affairs 54(1) (2000), pp. 24–42. Yılmaz Colak, türkiye'de devletin Kimlik Krizi ve Çeşitlilik: (Yeni-osmanlıcı, 
İslamcı ve Kürtçü Meydan okumalar) (ankara: Kadim, 2010).
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The following comments by two scholars are cases in point: ‘the 1997 ‘post-modern’ coup, 
in which the Islamist government of necmettin Erbakan was gently ousted’.12 Another aca-
demic said the February 28th was a postmodern coup because ‘the military observed what 
was coming and behaved in a way less destructive to the democratization process than a 
coup’.13Taking advantage of our better access to so many more resources, including new 
memoirs written by retired officers and newly exposed military documents 17 years after 
the February 28th, this article argues that as opposed to past military coup d’états—planned 
mostly by army officers in utmost secrecy, carried out swiftly and extra-legally and violently—
the February 28th coup was deliberately stretched over a long process, it was violent but 
not bloody, and was carried out openly through political machinations with the voluntary 
enlistment by the military of various civilian actors.
The February 28th Coup as the Harbinger of New Coups
A few scholars already noted the impact of structural factors on different dimensions of 
civil-military relations. Feldberg noted that ‘the role of the military is contingent upon the 
changing national and international environment with which it interacts and to which it 
must adapt’.14 Moskos et al. studied the changes in organisation of armed forces in several 
places after the end of the Cold War.15 desch undertook a structural study of CMR for the 
same period, exploring how the diminishing level of external threats and rising internal 
threats were primed to influence CMR.16 Marinov and Goemans argued that in the post-Cold 
War era international pressure influenced how fast coup plotters decided to have free and 
competitive elections after coups.17
Whether the end of bipolar international structure after the collapse of the Soviets may 
have also shifted the tactics of military interventions, however, is still left unasked. As attested 
by Major General Erol Özkasnak, then-General Secretary of the Turkish General Staff and 
one of the leading Turkish officers of the February 28th process, who said that ‘this is what a 
military in the 21st century does; everybody expected us to stage a coup like September 12 
1980 but we are the military of postmodern times. That’s how we do it. The duty to intervene 
befell on unarmed forces this time’ (italics are added),18 past tactics and strategies officers 
of ‘political armies’19 were not cast in stone. In other words, while ‘it was only befitting for a 
revolution [coup] in Turkey in the world of 1960s to be like May 27th 1960 coup’20 it may very 
well be the case that militaries may have adapted their methods of intervention in response 
12 ersel aydınlı, ‘a Paradigmatic shift for the turkish Generals and an end to the Coup era in turkey’, The Middle East Journal 
63(4) (2009), p. 585, (italics are mine).
13 nil Şatana, ‘transformation of the turkish Military and the Path to democracy’, Armed Forces & Society 34(3) (2008), p. 
367, (italics are mine).
14 G.a. Kourvetaris, ‘the Greek army officer Corps: its Professionalism and Political interventionism’, in Morris Janowitz and 
Jacques Van doorn (eds), On Military Intervention (rotterdam university Press, 1971), p. 156.
15 Charles C. Moskos, John allen Williams and david r segal (eds), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold 
War (new York: oxford university Press, 2000).
16 Michael C. desch, Civilian Control of The Military, The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md: the Johns hopkins 
university Press, 1999).
17Marinov and Goemans, ‘Coups and democracy’, p. 800.
18 İsmet Berkan, ‘hepimiz Kullanıldık’, T24, 16 april 2012, http://t24.com.tr/haber/ismet-berkan-medya-28-subatin-parcasi- 
oldu-hepimiz-kullanildik,201729.
19 Kees Koonings and dirk Kruijt (eds), Political Armies, The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy (london: 
Zed Books, 2002).
20M. emin aytekin, İhtilal Çıkmazı (İstanbul:dünya Matbaası, 1967), p. 219.
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to changing international and domestic circumstances. The February 28th coup process is 
an apposite case in point. As Major General Özkasnak frankly put it, 
February 28th was made in accordance with the circumstances of the period. A military coup similar 
to September 12th (1980) and 12 March (1971) in Turkey was unthinkable under domestic and 
global conditions in 1997. The [Islamist] danger to the secular Turkish Republic was overcome by 
mobilization of democratic mechanisms and without firing a single bullet and causing a nosebleed. 
This is why we used the term ‘unarmed forces’ [to describe the coup actors].21
Commenting on the February 28th process, another retired general said ‘by behaving in this 
manner, [Turkey’s] generals sent old-fashion coups into dustbin of history and embraced a 
whole new tactic/strategy to fulfill their mission of protecting the Turkish Republic’.22 Former 
Commander of Land Forces Aytaç Yalman (2002-2004) also argued that the armed forces 
adopted ‘a new style of action’ (yeni bir eylem tarzı) during the February 28th process.23 It is 
often forgotten that officers in interventionist armies may closely observe domestic and 
international political developments, weigh their intervention opportunities under new 
circumstances, revise their tactics, and seek new allies.
The February 28th as a Cornerstone Event
The February 28th coup was a watershed event in Turkish politics. one of its immediate 
consequences was the split between ‘Traditionalists’ and ‘Reformists’ inside the Milli Görüş 
Hareketi (national View Movement). This division later paved the way for the ‘conservative 
democratic’ political party, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and development 
Party), founded by the younger, reformist wing in 2001 and the ensuing gradual transfor-
mation of Turkish Islamism.24 It was the February 28th coup that enabled the AKP to form 
the single-party government after the 2002 general elections in the first place. For the coup 
process was not only deeply unpopular it also exposed the compliance with the status quo 
of left and right centre political parties.25 The February 28th process further eroded the peo-
ple’s confidence in politicians and political parties,26 which had already been low in the first 
place.27 It was no wonder that only the CHP and newly founded AKP [Republican People’s 
Party] were able to pass the 10 per cent threshold in 2002 elections.
The February 28th coup had resulted in another split between the Milli Görüş and the Gülen 
movement, a supposedly faith-based organisation. The Refah blamed Fethullah Gülen for 
ingratiating with the military to save his own flock from being persecuted. Gülen went on 
TV channels and gave interviews to newspapers, which were close to the secularist circles, 
during the coup process and ‘rejected the claim that national Security Council resolutions 
amounted to a coup. He argued that the military wanted to solve the crisis through demo-
cratic means and that the General Staff was acting in the spirit of their constitutional authority. 
21 hulki Cevizoğlu, Generalinden 28 Şubat İtirafı: Post-Modern Darbe (İstanbul: Ceviz Kabuğu, 2001), p. 56–7 (italics and 
brackets are added).
22nevzat Bölügiray, 28 Şubat Süreci. v.1 (İstanbul: tekin,1999), p. 237.
23aytaç Yalman, Zorlu Yılların Sessiz Tanığı-I: Vatana Adanmış Bir Hayat (İstanbul: Kastaş, aralık 2014), p. 140.
24M. hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2009), p. 6–8.
25 Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, ‘turkey 2002: Kemalism, islamism and Politics in the light of february 28 Process,’ The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 102(2/3) (spring/summer 2003), p. 316–17.
26 Yılmaz esmer, Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal Siyasal Ekonomik Değerler (İstanbul: teseV Yayınları, 1999), 
pp. 41–6; Şükrü elekdağ, ‘halkta Güven Bunalımı’ Milliyet, 29 april 2001. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/04/29/yazar/
elekdag.html.
27 Mehran, Kamrava, ‘Pseudo-democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: the rise and demise of turkey's
 Refah Party’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25(2) (1998), p. 286.
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In fact, soldiers were at times more democrats than civilians’.28 The Gülen movement, on the 
contrary, was frustrated with Erbakan’s actions, which they thought were imprudent. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is clearly seen today mutual suspicions between the AK Party, the 
leaders of which were former companions of Erbakan, and the Gülen movement must have 
been bottled up for years, even as they entered into a political marriage of convenience. 
nevertheless, this precarious alliance now lies in ruins after the corruption probe started by 
the Turkish police, believed to be dominated by members of the Gülen movement, against 
some leading AK Party ministers on 17 december 2014. A fierce political battle broke out. 
What is remarkable, however, is that both sides have sought to discredit each other claim-
ing that the other has become worse than the ruthless military and civilian actors of the 
February 28th coup.29 This shows the deep scars the February 28th coup must have left in 
the minds of two Islamic-oriented groups in Turkey and underlines the extent to which the 
coup subsequently influenced the trajectory of Turkish politics.
Coup d’état: What’s in a Name?
Several students of CMR have either taken for granted what coup is or they rested on 
Cold War time definitions of the concept when they were actually writing about the 
subject after the Cold War. For instance, Schiff, who brought important new insights into 
the post-Cold War CMR literature by her ‘concordance theory’, defined coup by referring 
to Luttwak, who had thought during the Cold War that coup d’état is made by military 
officers.30 The meaning of the concept must have been so obvious to nordlinger and 
desch that they left the concept undefined in their books.31 The latter only said an edited 
volume that ‘coups are direct seizures of power by the military’.32 A traditional coup d’état 
is attributed mostly to military officers.33 Extant categoriSations of ‘army roles in politics’ 
reflected this type of thinking. In these classifications, the military arbitrates/moderates, 
guards/corrects, and rules,34 displaces and supplants35 and rules and moderates36 and 
influences and blackmails civilian governments.37 Goemans and Marinov recently took 
28 ‘Gülen’in 28 Şubat Yorumu: asker anayasal Yetkisini Kullandı’ [Gülen’s Comments on the february 28th: the Military used 
its Constitutional Power]. T24, 13 april 2012, http://t24.com.tr/haber/fethullah-gulen-28-subat-icin-ne-demisti,201569.
29 Burak Kılıç and derviş Genç, ‘28 Şubat’tan Beter’ [Worse than the february 28th], Zaman, 16 January 2014; Bu Millet bu 
hançeri unutmaz [this nation Will not forget this stab in the Back], Yeni Şafak 1 March 2014.
30 rebecca schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations (london: routledge, 
2009), p. 21.
31eric a. nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (upper saddle river, nJ: Prentice hall, 1977).
32 Michael desch, ‘threat environments and Military Missions’, in larry diamond and Marc f. Plattner (eds), Civil-Military 
Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, Md: Johns hopkins university Press, 1996), pp. 12–30; also see Barbara Geddes, ‘What 
do We Know about democratization after twenty Years?’, Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): pp. 115–44, 128.
33 harvey G. Kebschull, ‘operation “Just Missed”: lessons from failed Coup attempts’, Armed Forces and Society 20(4) (1994), 
p. 565; Brian d. taylor, ‘russia’s Passive army: rethinking Military Coups’, Comparative Political Studies 34(8) (2001): p. 926; 
e. J. hobsbawm, ‘how to Plot Your takeover’, The New York Review of Books, 21 august 1969, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/1969/aug/21/how-to-plot-your-takeover/; ruth first, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and 
the Coup d’Etat (london: Penguin, 1970), p. 19; Peter d. feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Ma: harvard university Press, 2003), p. 10; talukder Maniruzzaman, ‘arms transfers, Military Coups, 
and Military rule in developing states’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(4) (2012), p. 734; aaron Belkin and evan 
schofer, ‘Coup risk, Counterbalancing and international Conflict’, Security Studies 14(1) (2005), p. 144.
34 talukder Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal from Politics: a Comparative Study (Cambridge, Ma: Ballinger, 1987), pp. 
61–82
35schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics, p. 22.
36nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, pp. 22–8.
37 finer, samuel e., The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 2nd ed. (london: Westview Press and Pinter 
Publishers, 1988), pp. 127–38;
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a broader understanding of the concept ‘as the seizure of effective executive authority 
through the threat or use of force’ and they acknowledge that actors perpetrating the 
coup may include the military, the police, a domestic armed group, a member of the 
governing elite or some other set of domestic actors’.38 Yet, they still seem to think that a 
coup has a leader or leaders, who upon their forceful takeover may decide on whether to 
have elections and run for it themselves.
despite the more recent recognition that coup actorness is not limited to armed forces,39 
the identity of perpetrators remains restricted to (civilian or armed) members of state 
apparatus or government. The civilian role is seen limited to either just resisting a coup 
attempt40 or ‘inducing’/calling for a coup.41 Singh recognises an additional role that civilian 
protestors might play; that is, when a military faction openly backs them.42 Yet, the role 
played by ‘civilian’ groups, who did not resist coups, did not actually knock the military’s 
doors to invite an intervention and do not just passively watch the army to intervene either, 
but voluntarily agree when recruited by the military, not as ‘auxiliary force in noncombat-
ant functions’,43 but as active participants in a wholesale campaign to bring an elected 
government down is still uncovered. only Encarnacion seems to have captured very well 
the novel role fulfilled by ‘civil society’ in occurrence of coup d’états by studying post-Cold 
War military interventions in Ecuador and Venezuela. As for Ecuador, while it used to be 
generals that dethroned Latin American presidents, this time a continuous general strike 
supported by business and labour unions incapacitated the government and eventually 
caused the downfall of Ecuador’s elected president in 1997.44 Mass protests by a coalition 
of business, labour and civilian groups enabled the military overthrow of President Chavez 
in 2002 as well.45 This, however, does not change the fact that this perspective on coups 
is still nascent.
Four past characteristics of coups emerge from these definitions: speed, secrecy, and 
extra-legality and army officers as its main actors. Luttwak stated already during the Cold 
War that ‘if speed is often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential 
requirement’.46 As Kebschull also pointed out, ‘a coup d’état is commonly defined as a speedily 
executed, extralegal takeover of a government by a conspiratorial group, usually consisting 
of army officers, that uses force or the threat of force to remove the government or assume 
power for itself’.47 Huntington said of coups that ‘laying the groundwork for them [coups] 
may take long time but ‘actual seize of power’ happens on the day a coup is launched’ (italics 
38Marinov and Goemans, ‘Coups and democracy’, pp. 801–2.
39Powell and thyne, ‘Global instances’, pp. 250–1.
40 see Jerzy J. Wiatr, ‘the Military regime in Poland, 1926-1939, in a Comparative Perspective’, in Morris Janowitz and Jacques 
Van (eds), On Military Intervention (rotterdam: rotterdam university Press, 1971), pp. 61–91, p. 65; edward luttwak, Coup 
D’etat: Practical Handbook (new York: alfred a. Knopf, 1969).
41 fitch, John samuel, The Military Coup D’etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-1966. (Baltimore, Md: the Johns hopkins 
university Press, 1977), p. 63.
42 naunihal singh, Seizing Power: the Strategic Logic of Military Coups. (Baltimore, Md: Johns hopkins university Press, 
2014), pp. 38–9.
43Wiatr, ‘the Military regime’, p. 65.
44‘ecuador’s post-modern coup’, The Economist 15 february 1997.
45omar G. encarnación, ‘Venezuela’s ‘Civil society Coup’’, World Policy Journal 19(2) (2002), pp. 38–48.
46 luttwak, Coup D’etat, p. 149.
47Kebschull, ‘operation “Just Missed”, p. 566, (my italics).
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are added).48 Several others concur.49 The following is how a coup happened during the 
Cold War: 
The clock strikes 4 AM. over the radio a codeword is transmitted. Upon hearing this signal, 2 
armored brigades and 1 infantry brigade move out from their barracks just outside the city limits. 
Within minutes troops have cordoned off the capital and the state’s two other major cities, sur-
rounding the state television, radio station, airport and major roads. Troops then moved toward 
the offices of the two main political parties and the residences of the party leaders and prime 
minister. The junta—consisting of the Chief of the General Staff, various generals, and a handful 
of field-rank officers fanned out to key government offices, the television and radio stations.50
Truly, almost all military coups in the Middle East followed the same script during the Cold 
War.51 The classical coup d’état in Turkey in September 1980 and coups in Latin America52 
followed exact same patterns as well. When old-fashion coups are taken into account, it 
would be easy to conclude that ‘as extralegal efforts to secure political power, coups are 
always potentially violent operations’ and coup leaders must be ready to be ruthless.53 What 
is meant by being ruthless and violent, however, is that blood is spilt during and after a coup. 
Huntington, for instance, equated ‘violence’ with the amount of ‘blood’ spilt and lives lost 
when he said ‘violence employed in coups is usually small’ and that ‘most coups in most areas 
of the world involve only a handful of deaths’.54 Marshall and Marshall measured ‘violence’ 
as one of the criteria of a coup by ‘the number of persons killed during the coup and/or as 
a direct result of the coup event. A coup can indeed be bloodless,55 but this should not be 
equated to non-violence. As will be discussed, no blood was spilt during the February 28th 
coup process but the coup itself was very violent, only in a different sense.
The February 28th Coup by ‘Process’
The following has become the standard, yet equally misleading, account of how February 
28th happened: 
At a February 28, 1997 meeting of the nSC, the military issued an 18-point list of policy recommen-
dations to the True Path-Welfare Party coalition government. The list focused on extending com-
pulsory education from five to eight years and restricting the activities of religious schools and 
private Quran courses which that military believed were fostering anti-secular values. Erbakan, 
already under pressure from radical elements within his party for not implementing his election 
manifesto, refused to carry out the nSC recommendations and was ousted in June 1997.56
48 samuel P. huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (new haven, Ct: Yale university Press, 1973), p. 218; also see 
Marshall and Marshall. ‘Coup d’état events, 1946-2013’, p. 2.
49 Wiatr, ‘the Military regime’, p. 64 (italics are added); Claude emerson Welch (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military: Theory 
and Cases From Developing Countries (albany, nY: state university of new York, 1976), p.1; nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 
p. 5; singh, Seizing Power, p. 16; ruth first, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’Etat (london: 
Penguin, 1970), p. 19; david C. rapoport, ‘the Praetorian army: insecurity, Venality, and impotence’, in roman Kolkowicz and 
andrzej Korbonski (eds.), Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing 
Societies (Boston, Ma: G. allen & unwin 1982), p. 257; Keith hopkins, ‘Civil-Military relations in developing Countries’, The 
British Journal of Sociology 17(2) (1966), p. 178; Patrick J. McGowan, ‘african Military Coups d'état, 1956–2001: frequency, 
trends and distribution’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 41(3) (2003), p. 342.
50 luttwak quoted in Paul ernest lenze Jr., ‘Civil-Military relations in “islamic democracies”: Military intervention & Withdrawal 
in algeria, Pakistan, & turkey’ (Ph.d. dissertation, Washington state university, 2011), p. 1.
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This is an incorrect portrayal of the February 28th coup process because the military had 
started to stalk the Islamic-oriented ‘Welfare Party’ (Refah Partisi) even before the municipal 
elections in 1994 when the Refah, deemed an anti-systemic Islamist political party, won local 
administration in major Turkish cities. The 1994 municipal elections came as the first shock.57 
Arcayürek, who was then-advisor to President Süleyman demirel, noted that the General 
Staff commissioned a polling firm to help them predict the upcoming general election results 
and was very perturbed by its results.58 In an ironic move, the military tried to exploit the 
power of religion—something they always blamed politicians for—to undermine Refah’s 
appeal by commissioning some Turkish theology professors to write a book entitled ‘İslam 
Gerçeği’ [The Truth of Islam].59
Refah’s subsequent win in the 1995 general elections sent shivers through the Kemalist 
state establishment and military circles.60 In the words of Admiral Erkaya, ‘there were other 
political parties that sought regime change in Turkey before. Yet, it was the first time, the 
Refah, as one of such political parties, got the chance to actually capture the government 
seat’.61 The swift rise of the Refah became the embodiment of increasingly public visibility of 
Muslim identity as one of the worst fears of the Kemalist state establishment for about the 
last century. It automatically triggered the most fundamental fault line around the issue of 
‘secularism’ as the linchpin of Kemalist regime. Various ‘secular’ Kemalist forces, starting with 
the military, mobilised accordingly. The military brass warned leaders of two centre-right 
political parties, doğru Yol Partisi (the True Path Party) and Anavatan Partisi (the Motherland 
Party), not to consider building coalition with it. They urged leaders of these parties to as 
soon as possible reconcile and form an anti-Refah government.62 It is claimed that then-
chief of General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı paid a visit to Mustafa Kalemli, the Chairman of 
the TGnA (Turkish Grand national Assembly), to let him know about their misgivings and 
ask him to convey their concerns to other political leaders.63 The patchwork Ana-Yol gov-
ernment, which could hardly be formed without the military’s push, was short-lived. doğru 
Yol and the Refah Party eventually formed, against the wishes of the military, the Refah-
Yol government in June 1996. The military and the mainstream media then accelerated its 
actions against the Refah.64 The Chief of Staff Karadayı’s analogy between the rise of the 
Refah and the rise of Khoumeni and later Islamic Revolution in Iran was meant to admonish 
the government that Turkey’s generals would not be as naïve and late to respond as the 
Iranian generals were with the rise of fundamentalists before the Iranian Revolution.65 The 
nation-wide protests, called ‘Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir dakika Karanlık Eylemleri’ [A Minute of 
darkness for Permanent Brightness], began for the sake of transparency and democracy but 
‘morphed into the anti-government campaign’ shortly after.66 The ‘Psychological operations 
Unit’ of the Turkish General Staff initiated a psychological warfare against the government 
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by fabricating shocking and disturbing news for the media and organising protest meetings 
and marches.67
Top-ranking generals met at the navy Command in Gölcük for a war simulation on 22-24 
January 1997. They had the opportunity there to ‘reflect on the state of the country, its vulner-
ability to the Islamist domination and how to get into further action to counter the threat’.68 
on 4 February 1997 tanks rolled on the streets of Sincan, a neighbourhood at the nation’s 
capital. The official explanation by the military was that tanks were on their way to a regular 
military exercise, but everybody knew that it was a show of intimidation.69 The deputy chief 
of staff at the time, General Çevik Bir, said that tanks moved on the streets of Sincan to ‘fine-
tune Turkey’s democracy’. The infamous nSC meeting followed on 28 February 1997. An unu-
sual document entitled ‘The Measures to be Taken Against Religious Reactionist Hostilities 
Against the Regime’ and consisting of 18 articles, was added to the usual national Security 
Council decisions. These draconian measures the military brass demanded the government 
to implement right away were not decided during the meeting, however. The top-ranking 
generals had already decided in a closed meeting after the nSC meeting in december 1996 
and made a list of measures that would be handed to the Islamic-oriented government.70 
This and an official military document dated 19 February 1997 show that the military had 
already sent out instructions to its land and naval forces to use their officers and their fami-
lies to collect intelligence on governors, mayors as well as civilian associations, foundations, 
dormitories, university faculties and professional associations.71
Batı Çalışma Grubu [Western Study Group- BÇG] was later founded at the General Staff 
Headquarters. Western Working Group exerted enormous power during the coup process, 
raining down the military hierarchy various types of orders such as ‘daily orders’ and ‘con-
tinuous/principle orders’ to track down Islamic fundamentalism and contain/eliminate 
it.72 As its Batı Çalışma Grubu Rapor Sistemi [Western Study Group Report System] dated 
29 April 1997 showed, all garrisons and military posts in residential areas were ordered 
to collect intelligence on places and members of tariqahs, dergahs, tekke, Koranic schools, 
İmam-Hatip schools and student dormitories, hutbas in all mosques and report suspected 
events in the form of Batı Çalışma Grubu Günlük Durum Raporları [Western Study Group 
daily Situation Reports] and Batı Çalışma Grubu Olay Bildirim Raporları [Western Study Group 
Incident notification Reports] to the headquarters of Western Study Group at the General 
Staff in Ankara.73 The headquarters would then notify the proper state authorities about these 
‘religious reactionist’ activities and officially request them to take immediate measures.74 
Article (d) of Batı Eylem Planı [Western Action Plan] set as its goal to ‘investigate, find out and 
expose to the public activities and investments of those political parties, foundations and 
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68 sedat ergin, o Gece Gölcük’te neler Konuştuk? Hürriyet, 3 november 1999 ; Cevizoğlu, Generalinden 28 Şubat İtirafı , p. 73.
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associations, institutions and other organizations, media organizations, financial institutions 
and business groups that support religious reactionist activities and hurt the country’.75
In the following months General Çetin doğan, during a briefing to the press, announced 
the new ‘national Military Strategic Concept’ (MASK: Milli Askeri Strateji Konsepti), in which 
‘Islamic reactionalism (irtica), rather than Kurdish separatism or any other external threat, 
became the number one threat to Turkey’s security’.76 The General Staff was afflicted with 
the paranoia of undefined ‘religious reactionism’, which in the end caused divisions within 
the Turkish Armed Forces and damaged its unity as well. The military collected intelligence 
on what they called ‘Islamist or Green capital’ as well. Judges and public prosecutors were 
‘informed’ in a briefing in June 1997, prepared jointly by General Staff Intelligence and 
General Staff's Counter-Intelligence and Security department, that ‘the Islamist business class 
was already in control of half of Turkey’s gross domestic product (GdP). In 1997, the Islamists 
owned 19 newspapers, 110 magazines, 51 radio stations, 20 TV channels, 2,500 associations, 
500 foundations, more than a thousand companies, 1,200 dormitories, and more than 800 
private schools and university exam-preparation courses’.77 In response to this ‘threat’, the 
military made known a list of 100 Islamic companies that it from thenceforth banned from 
participating in all sorts of military tenders.78 Then on 12 June 1997 pro-military Hürriyet 
daily ran a headline saying that a high-ranking officer stated in a closed briefing that if push 
comes to shove the military will not shy away using their guns.79
‘Unarmed Forces’ in Action
Civilians may indeed participate in coups by calling an army to do its ‘patriotic duty’ and ‘save 
the country from ruin’.80 However, civilian exhortations for coup was reversed in the case of 
February 28th coup d’état, as it was the military this time that openly called secular Kemalist 
civilian groups to fulfil their ‘patriotic duty’.81 Civilian protests did not start spontaneously. 
Admiral Erkaya extended the military’s open invitation to these groups in late 1996 with 
the following sentences: 
The society is in a state of deep inertia. Everybody is far too relaxed because they think if things 
go too bad, the armed forces are here to resolve problems. Even the leader of main opposition 
suffers from this lazy mood. Yet, the army should not be expected to solve political problems. 
Civilian actors, MPs, and Parliament should find the solution. Solution must be looked for in 
these platforms. This time unarmed forces must deal with the issue.82
The idea, as echoed in a similar thinking by a Major General a decade later, was that pre-
serving the secular Republican nation-state founded by Ataturk and early elite befell on the 
Republican prosecutors, Turkish military, universities, Turkey’s secular intelligentsia, and ordi-
nary people themselves as its designated inheritors.83 The entire gamut of Turkey’s secular 
forces firmly aligned themselves against what they perceived as an existential ‘Islamic threat’ 
during the February 28th coup process. As Cizre and Çınar pointed out, ‘the Turkish military, 
75Öztürk, Belgelerle 28 Şubat Dünden Bugüne, p. 103.
76eligür, The Mobilization, p. 222.
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former President Süleyman demirel (1993-2000), the civil societal network of the secular 
establishment, media, and large sectors of the populace believe that Islamic reactionism 
constitutes the chronic, if at times undetectable malaise of the Turkish polity.84 The idea of 
close collaboration between these forces was not new though; at least some high-ranking 
military officers were aware that ‘it was not prudent to stage a military coup unless approved 
by universities, media, legal forces, and the man on the streets’.85 The February 28th coup pro-
cess differed in a single but most critical aspect, however; the military was no longer asking 
for after-party ‘hosannas’ from the state intelligentsia and other civilian actors, as they had 
done after 1960 military intervention.86 They demanded active involvement during the coup 
process this time. As Batı Harekat Konsepti, Batı Çalışma Grubu, and Batı Eylem Planı, which 
have been accepted by the top-ranking generals of the period (now retired) as authentic 
and confirmed during the judicial process against the perpetrators of the coup, indicates, 
the military planned to ‘shape public opinion with the help of political parties, universities, 
trade unions, democratic mass organizations, women and youth organizations, media, and 
catalyze people’s reactions through protests, demonstrations and scientific meetings at all 
levels (such as panels, symposia, conference)’.87 The plan worked very well, as Admiral Erkaya 
said in his memoirs that ‘‘unarmed forces’ got the army’s message […] [our call] caused instant 
stir in the streets’.88 Thus, we may say, by adapting a little of what Cercas had said for the 1981 
coup in Spain, that ‘from the summer of 1996 onward politicians, businessmen, trade unions 
and journalists were deliriously exaggerating the gravity of the situation’ in the country.89
Trade and Labour Unions in Action
If coup plotters maintained the old coup practices, they could have easily perceived trade 
unions as a potential threat to their chances of success due to trade unions’ experience in 
industrial agitation and mobilisation.90 Indeed, post-1980 coup authorities saw the Labour 
and Trade Union leaders as ‘new Aghas, who exploited good intentions of innocent workers’,91 
and prohibited them from getting involved in political activities after the 1980 coup.92 In 
1997 however, the military brass knew that they could count on the trade unions to support 
the coup. It was still startling that different trade unions such as Türk-İş [Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions], dİSK [Confederation of Progressive Labor Unions], TESK [Confederation 
of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen], ToBB [The Union of Chambers and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey] and TİSK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations], which called 
themselves during the coup process the ‘five-member gang’ or ‘initiative of the five’, were 
able to come together in the first place. despite being former archenemies, they formed an 
alliance and ‘called for the resignation of the government. The disturbing side of the picture 
was that those associations were activated, if not actually mobilized, by the military and 
84 Ümit Cizre ve Menderes Çınar, ‘turkey 2002: Kemalism, islamism and Politics in the light of february 28 Process’, The South 
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they were extremely circumspect regarding various actions by the military’.93 They did more 
than just remain cautious though. The General Secretary of Türk-İş, Şemsi denizer, said that, 
‘Turkish armed forces and non-governmental organizations are in unity. If a coup is necessary 
to protect Ataturkist principles and reforms, armed forces will undertake the job and we will 
support them’.94 The Head of TİSK, Refik Baydur, called briefings given by the army as ‘Turkish 
military reaching out to the nation’ and ‘the most democratic and civilized hug between the 
nation and its army’.95 He argued in his memoirs that some policies of Refah greatly disturbed 
[Kemalist] state institutions loyal to the Republic and Ataturk reforms and therefore, there 
was a need for responsible institutions to put an end to this through ‘democratic’ means. 
And they, as the ‘five-member gang’ or ‘initiative of the five’ satisfied that need.96
In the days after the nSC on February 28, heads of TÜRK-İŞ, dİSK and TESK sent a letter to 
all MPs in the parliament in which they called themselves ‘Turkey’s unarmed guardians’ and 
reminded the MPs of the oath they made in the name of secularism and Ataturk’s Republic. 
They thought that they would achieve their aims with ‘clean, secular, honest, sensitive and 
Ataturkist MPs, who are independent of their party leaders’. Their wish came true a few 
months later with the resignation of some MPs from the coalition partner dYP.97 ToBB, TESK, 
TÜRK-İŞ, dİSK and TİSK put out a joint public statement on 21 May 1997, in which they pro-
fessed once again their faithfulness to the Ataturkist principles and reforms and indirectly 
blamed the government for undermining the foundation of the Turkish Republic and called 
for a new government.98 The president of TESK, derviş Günday, claimed that the govern-
ment inexcusably fell into unacceptable opposition with bureaucracy, universities, soldiers, 
peasants, workers, nGos, media, and state. Fundamentalists were attacking the secular and 
democratic Republic and the regime.99
The Media
If we were to maintain our classical notion of a coup d’état, discussing the media as an actor 
of a coup would not make much sense: ‘The press need not be a primary target; we will 
establish our authority over it after the coup’, had said Luttwak.100 Truly, the relationship of 
post-1980 coup military government in Turkey with the domestic media was one of confron-
tation, close watch, and censor. Turkey’s then military ruler Kenan Evren said at a Supreme 
Military Council meeting on 25 november 1982 that ‘newspapers care for one thing only: 
how many they sell’.101 The media had also been utilised in previous military incursions into 
politics after the coup for the post-hoc objective of providing justification for it because 
the military used to consider ‘society as a spectator’ not a ‘potential actor in the events’.102 
That is to say, normally we would not expect to see media reporters on the scene of a coup 
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attempt, since a coup was supposed to be an extralegal, surprise and swift event to allow 
for the media to broadcast it live.103
nevertheless, the role of media was entirely reversed in the February 28th, as it assisted 
during, not after, the February 28th coup process by creating favourable conditions. In other 
words, transformation of the media in Turkey from ‘state-controlled’ to ‘private pluralistic’ in 
the 1990s partly shaped the way the coup was executed this time. That in turn demanded 
that media be used in a different way for a different purpose. The following comment by 
Javier Cercas on the 1981 coup in Spain explains the overall role of the media on the February 
28th coup in Turkey: 
… in much of the media the criticism of Suarez [Erbakan] is brutally harsh and contributes to 
spurring on the coup d’état mentality, feeding the phantom of an emergency situation and 
giving space on their pages to constant rumors of political operations and hard or soft coups 
under way that, rather than prevent them, serves to prepare the ground for them.104
The army brass wrote in the document named Batı Harekat Konsepti that ‘the role the media 
plays in raising the awareness in public opinion is very significant. Some major media cor-
porations that have indisputable loyalty to the secularism principle must prioritize these 
lofty principles and the Republic as a national duty over their ratings wars’.105 Therefore, the 
primary function the media assumed was to sell to the public the ‘fundamentalist threat’ 
and convince them that the rise in deviant and bizarre Islamic practices shown on and 
newspapers was due to the government. Here the media, especially the TV created a ‘reality 
effect’ to imbue a non-existing reality to fictive threats.106 The most memorable example of 
this was the ‘Fadime Şahin-Müslüm Gündüz affair’, in which Şahin, a young veiled lady, was 
caught on camera in an improper situation with Gündüz, who happened to be the leader 
of the Aczmendi sect, which nobody had heard of until then. It was later found out that the 
whole episode was another psychological warfare executed this time by notorious JİTEM 
[Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Agency]. not coincidentally, Batı Eylem 
Planı said that top brass would try to make sure that ‘issues around Aczmendi, sham and 
deviant religious figures would remain in circulation in the media’.107
In an unusual practice the military picked some journalists and gave them certificates 
in the national Security Academy.108 Some dissident journalists, nevertheless, were heavily 
pressured to fall into place. The journalists who were too vocal in criticising the military’s 
actions were subjected to psychological and political operations. For instance, some rep-
utable journalists, who were at loggerheads with the military’s tutelage over politics, were 
accused of being ‘PKK İşbirlikçileri’ [PKK Collaborators]. The claim was that one of the top 
PKK members confessed in his interrogation that some well-known journalists were on PKK’s 
payroll. It was found out later that the entire show was another operation of psychological 
warfare designed by the plotters of February 28th.109 Several columnists, media patrons and 
executives of the period, who positioned themselves at the forefront of the war against the 
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government, now admit to being pressured by the generals to toe the anti-government 
campaign line.110 nevertheless, the willingness on the part of the media to facilitate a coup 
process such as the February 28th needs to be duly noted.111
The Judiciary
Turkey’s Kemalist judicial organs played their part in the process as well. The Presidents of 
High Judicial bodies made it their habit during February 28th to publicly scold the Refah in 
their speeches during official ceremonies, which the TV used to air live. The President of 
Turkey’s Supreme Court, President of the Constitutional Court, and President of Union of 
Turkish Bar Associations reprimanded the government during official public ceremonies in 
the coup process. Chief Prosecutor Vural Savaş moved fast after the government resigned 
and demanded the closure of the Refah, to which the Constitutional Court responded by 
shutting it down and banning some Islamist politicians. Savaş said that shortly after he 
applied to the Constitutional Court for the closure of Refah, the General Staff sent him loads 
of documents, which he believed to have been prepared by Batı Çalışma Grubu, to support 
his closure case.112
Members of judicial organs were enlisted by the military through specially prepared brief-
ings as well. Some 420 judges and prosecutors as well as the head and most members of the 
Constitutional Court and Council of State attended a briefing delivered by a high-ranking 
general at the General Staff on 10 June 1997. While some judges and prosecutors cooper-
ated fully with the military in suspending freedoms, other prosecutors, who struck down 
university administrations’ ban on wearing veil at university campuses for instance, were 
given punitive relocations. ‘The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors’ swiftly carried 
out such measures against dissident voices inside the state establishment.113
Süleyman demirel, then president, was a powerful player on his own account during the 
coup process. While demirel did at times seem to be trying to avert a military coup d’état 
by openly warning the Refah-Yol government, he in fact ensured that a coup still occurred 
without the military needing to leave its barracks. demirel viewed the civilian protests against 
the incumbent government, for instance on 10 november Ataturk Memorial day, as ‘the 
owners of the regime finally showing themselves’.114 demirel readily accepted when the 
General Staff wanted to brief him about the threat of religious reactionism. demirel then 
almost guided the military by saying that ‘this threat could be tackled if the state takes 
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some practical measures such as preventing the government’s penetration into the national 
Intelligence, TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Corporation], and universities. demirel said, 
‘for instance, the government ‘infiltrated some universities in the form of appointing close-
minded university professors but he cleansed universities at the administrative level by 
rejecting government-led appointments’.115
Vural Savaş, former chief public prosecutor of Court of Cassation [Yargıtay], who filed the 
party closure case against the Refah, said in his memoirs that President demirel congratulated 
him for the role he played in the process.116 President demirel never defended the civilian 
government against any encroachment by the armed forces during the February 28th coup 
process. He re-directed an intelligence report sent to him by the Police Intelligence concern-
ing the on-going coup activities in the navy to the General Staff instead of investigating 
the claims. When the report and its content were leaked to the public, the president still 
remained silent.117 The president could have simply defended the constitutional right of the 
government to reject the ‘advisory’ resolutions of the national Security Council on February 
28th 1997, but instead he chose to press the government to enforce them.118 In brief, the late 
President demirel made sure that the military deposed the incumbent government, albeit not 
by naked power, but by a novel coup process without the conventional attributes of a coup.
Finally, politicians saw an opening for themselves in the coup campaign against the Refah-
Yol government. The following assessment by Retired Pakistani Lt General Asad durrani 
regarding how politicians approach a coup is valid for Turkey: ‘the second choice of every 
political party in Pakistan is the military. The first is obvious’.119 A few illustrations will suffice 
to show how politicians ‘helped’ the coup process ‘because they were the chief candidates 
to assume government if the Islamic-led coalition resigned’.120 The leader of the Anavatan 
Party, Mesut Yılmaz, said that the anti-government coalition was ‘a democratic resistance 
by Turkish society in cooperation with non-governmental organizations and various state 
organs’.121 After PM Erbakan resigned on 18 June 1997, deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP 
admitted the new method army officers used to depose the government, but found nothing 
misguided with it: 
our army contributed to the formation of the public opinion. It informed the society of exist-
ing problems and concerns like a democratic mass organization […] I do not want to say this 
is appropriate [but] this is my understanding of what happened […] The least of undesirable 
methods was therefore chosen, a brand new method. The regime was not interrupted, not even 
an official memorandum was given. Public opinion was engineered; Refah’s mask was exposed.122
The elected MPs from doğru Yol resigned from their political parties to put pressure on their 
party leader as well as their peers in the national Assembly to withdraw their support for the 
coalition.123 High-ranking military officers played a role here as well, as they directly prodded 
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these MPs to resign from the government. A Vice-Admiral in the Turkish navy admitted in 
his memoirs that he and Turkey’s Ambassador to the EU pressed in a dinner party Turhan 
Tayan, the national defense Minister from the dYP in the Refah-Yol government, to resign 
from the government because ‘one cannot claim to be an Ataturkist and yet continue to sit 
in this government cabinet’.124
Long, Slow, ‘Legal’ and Violent
The February 28th coup was made gradually on purpose by supposedly civilian and demo-
cratic forces so that the coup would not appear as one. Another reason the coup was spread 
over a process was that although actions may have seemed against the government, the 
real objective was to undermine the idea of ‘political/public Islam’.125 The February 28th coup 
sought to correct what was left incomplete in the ‘veto coup’ of May 1960 to permanently 
exclude certain societal sectors from the government.126 In doing so, it deviated from the 
past practices of the Turkish military during its interventions. The military used to be careful 
to not be perceived as favouring a particular class, ethnicity or religion at the expense of 
the rest when it decided to overthrow existing governments. It was true that the May 27th 
1960 coup was a ‘veto coup’, ‘…to curtail the participation in politics of leaders supported 
by the more traditional and conservative rural masses’.127 Yet, once the coup action was 
over and successful, the 1960 coup communiqué issued via radio said that ‘our action is not 
against any particular person or group’. A similar assessment can be made for the 1980 coup 
d’état.128 The February 28th coup, on the other hand, was widely perceived as undermining 
a particular segment of society. It is for this reason that it left such a bitter taste and causes 
so much division within the armed forces itself.129
The peculiarities of the February 28th had direct consequences for military and politics in 
Turkey. Since February 28th coup was done in a unique style over a process without soldiers 
and tanks leaving their barracks, they did not return to their barracks after the coup either. 
This rendered the coup permanent.130 As chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu 
(1998-2002) said after the fall of the Refah-Yol government, ‘February 28 process is not over; 
its duration may be 10 years, 20 years, 100 years or 500 years. As long as religious reaction-
ism continues, February 28th page shall never be closed’.131 This was a sharp break with the 
tradition for the Turkish military since it ‘always and quickly returned to its barracks after 
correcting the wrongs in the system’.132
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As against the claim that an activity must be illegal for it to be coup,133 the February 
28th was staged openly through ‘theoretically constitutional political operations’,134 and 
psychological warfare. This implies that if we were to take ‘illegality’ as a criterion of a coup, 
the February 28th could not have been one because the Refah-Yol government resigned 
instead of its power being seized by coup perpetrators. The national Security Council, the 
main mechanism for the military to drive the government into a corner, was a constitutional 
mechanism. However, focusing too much on the ‘legality’ clause without noticing that armed 
forces was not authorised to open a psychological warfare against a government and may 
not independently collect intelligence on its own society without ever letting the national 
Security Council or the government at the helm, may lead us to miss the changing face and 
shape of new coups.
American Ambassador to Turkey, James W. Spain (1980-1981) and nicholas Ludington 
were only partially correct when they remarked that, ‘the three military interventions since 
1960 [1960, 1971, and 1997] have been swift, nearly bloodless, and relatively popular’.135 For, 
pre-1997 interventions were certainly swift but their popularity is debatable and at least two 
of them were not bloodless at all. The Turkish prime minister and two his ministers were exe-
cuted after the 1960 coup while hundreds of thousands of people were taken into custody, 
hundreds of people were tortured in prisons, thousands were tried for capital offenses, tens 
of people were hanged, and leading politicians were banned from political activities after 
the 1980 coup d’état. The February 28th coup may look different at first glance because no 
blood was spilt on the streets, but the coup was violent nevertheless.
The Constitutional Court shut down the Refah in January 1998 on grounds of its being 
‘the center of activities against secularism’. Erbakan in addition to some other ‘Islamist’ politi-
cians were later banned from politics for five years. The then Mayor of İstanbul Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan was sent to prison on charges of inciting violence and religious discrimination by 
reading a poem. Tens of radio stations were shut down, many associations were closed down 
and their properties were confiscated.136 Tens of İmam-Hatip schools were shut down and 
their graduates were no more able to go to university departments of social and physical 
sciences because of YÖK’s new official restrictions. Tens of academics and civil servants were 
sacked from universities and public institutions. Thousands of veiled young girls were not 
admitted to universities, most of who were forced to quit the school.137
Conclusion
The February 28th coup by process in Turkey is a testimony to the critical evolution of coup 
d’états after the Cold War. This article argued that coups may no longer be staged on a cer-
tain day, they may be violent without being bloody, and may be openly executed in a long 
process. Civilian involvement in addition to military officers and walking around the edges 
of constitutionality form some of its most intriguing and perplexing new features, however 
counterintuitive this may sound.
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Although coups now disappeared in the developed West, they may put on new faces in 
the developing rest, where army officers may find new allies to recruit as well as new cracks 
and loopholes to exploit to their advantage on the fringes of their frail democracies and 
defective constitutions. Though untouched for space concerns in this article, the question of 
why militaries revise their methods of intervention and seek new allies needs to be accounted 
for as well. In the case of the February 28th coup process, one may draw attention to two 
factors: the end of the state’s monopoly over media outlets with the corollary increase in the 
number of TV channels in the 1990s; and external actors, in particular how the US approached 
a coup in Turkey in the 1990s. Whatever the reason(s) may be, however, students of CMR 
would do better if they revisited their fundamental variables so that they are more able to 
call more and more obscure and complex cases of coups for what they are.
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